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The Law of Estimates and Quantum Meruit
in Canadian Small Scale Building Contracts
Muharem Kianieff

This paper discusses the legal regime that governs estimates
given by building contractors to owners of small businesses. The
paper examines the present common law approaches that
attempt to adjudicate disputes between contractors and owners
by examining the law of estimates and quantum meruit
respectively. It is argued that the law has developed in a
particular manner in order to protect contractors from
information asymmetries vis-à-vis owners in the context of largescale construction projects. These information asymmetries are
not present between owners vis-à-vis contractors in the small
scale context, with the end result being that contractors are able
to rely on some of the legal devices and doctrines to their
advantage against owners. Some recent court decisions have
attempted to adjudicate the issue however many of these cases
tend to be decided on the basis of findings of fact rather than
applying the developed caselaw. The paper argues that
transactions costs and uncertainties can be minimized if
legislatures were to adopt a bright line rule similar to that in
effect in the Province of Ontario with respect to consumer
transactions whereby building contracts cannot exceed
estimated amounts by more than ten percent. It is argued that
this approach brings with it more predictability for small
business and also provides a powerful incentive for contractors
to take reasonable care in providing estimates to clients who rely
on their expertise.
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Introduction

One of the realities of modern construction is that things rarely go as one initially
anticipated. It has become a standard practice, to budget for unforeseen contingencies
since things inevitably end up being more elaborate or cost more than one initially
imagined at the outset. Yet, many consumers and small businesses are in the
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unenviable position of not knowing what the true cost of a construction project will be,
and are therefore dependent upon the expertise of contractors in determining what any
given project is likely to cost. Anyone with any experience in building / renovations
understands that estimates form a crucial factor in the decision making process. An
accurate estimate is essential in order for individuals to make an assessment as to
whether they can afford to engage the services of a contractor. The question that this
paper will address is what is the liability of a building contractor for an estimate that is a
marked departure from the final cost of the project (assuming that the project is
unchanged from the time that the estimate was given)?

The question is difficult to answer since most common law provinces in Canada do
not have any statutory provisions that govern the law of estimates. In these provinces,
the matter is left to be resolved in the courts. With respect to the jurisprudence in this
area, recent decisions have attempted to apply certain precedents developed through
construction law to what amounts to a basic consumer protection problem. The results,
I suggest, have thus far been unsatisfactory since the case law attempts to import
judicial remedies that were designed to assist builders in a larger scale context where
there is an information asymmetry that renders them vulnerable to errors made in
representations made by owners.

The trouble with these decisions is that by importing these remedies to what I shall
refer to as the small scale context, courts are in some cases allowing builders to profit
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from information asymmetries that they have vis-à-vis small scale owners. This was not
the intention of the courts when the original rules were laid down as they were
developed to provide a remedy in one context and are now being used in a completely
different context. In this paper, a large scale construction project refers to a high value
construction project where the owner supplies the contractor with their own engineering
and drawings and provides the contractor with the exact specifications related to the
project. A small scale project is defined as a lower value construction project where the
contractor is expected to develop the technical specifications, engineering and drawings
in accordance with the particular design concepts that are communicated to the
contractor by the owner. In other words, it is the contractor in this sense that is
providing the technical advice to the owner as to how the proposed project may be
realized.

The situation is somewhat different, although still problematic in the Province of
Ontario. In 2002, Ontario enacted section ten of the Consumer Protection Act 2002
(hereinafter CPA) that caps the amount that any supplier of goods and services can
exceed over and above a previously estimated amount to ten percent over the original
estimate.1 However, this section must be read in conjunction with the definition of
“consumer” that is found in section one of the CPA. This definition limits the application
of the act to those individuals that are acting for a personal, family or household

1

Consumer Protection Act 2002. S.O. 2002, c. 30. See also the similar provisions in the Saskatchewan Consumer
Protection Act S.S. 1996, c. C-30.1 at s. 6 (g), Alberta Fair Trading Act. R.S.A. 2000, c. F-2 at s. 6 (2) (e), and
British Columbia Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act. S.B.C. 2004, c. 2 at s. 4 (3)(c)(iii). For the sake
of brevity, I will refer to these approaches collectively as the “Ontario rule” as the Ontario version is the most
expansive of the four.
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purpose and specifically excludes individuals that are acting for a business purpose.2
While section ten is no doubt a step in the right direction, the limitations found in section
one make owners of small businesses that lack the sophistication of their larger scale
counterparts, particularly vulnerable to unscrupulous contractors that use the estimate
as a means of inducing parties to enter into a “cost-plus contract.” This type of contract
is essentially limitless in the amount that can be charged for the work performed (more
on this below). Consequently, remedies for small businesspersons and for individuals
in most common law jurisdictions, must be found in the common law (and hence,
usually through recourse of a costly court case). Given the fact that the amounts in
dispute are relatively low vis-à-vis the significant costs of a trial, contractors have a built
in advantage that gives them additional leverage against small businesses in forcing
them to settle cases out of court and gives contractors little incentive to take reasonable
care in the preparation of their estimates.

This paper will argue that greater certainty and subsequent reductions of
transactions costs will be achieved through a bright line rule, preferably established
through legislation, that will place restrictions in the variance that final costs may deviate
from estimated amounts as they relate to small scale commercial building contracts in a
manner that is similar to that which is set out in the Ontario rule with respect to personal
or household transactions. A bright line rule will eliminate the uncertainty that allows
contractors to pressure small business into favorable settlements out of court and will

2

Ibid. at s. 1.
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serve as a powerful incentive for contractors to adequately take care when offering
estimates to small business owners.

Part one of this paper describes the historical origins of the common law as it has
developed with respect to the law of estimates for construction projects including the
action for quantum meruit for claims beyond the agreed contract. Part two describes
some of the contractual devices that are commonly used in construction projects. Part
three considers recent judicial decisions dealing with small scale building contracts.
Part four offers some concluding observations and considers some modest proposals
for reform and also discusses the general law of responsibility for estimates.

Part One: The Historical Development of the Law of Estimates and
Quantum Meruit

Business Realities in Building Contracts

Unfortunately, the construction industry does not enjoy particularly high esteem in
dealing with consumers, as it is the subject of a rather high volume of complaints. For
instance, from 2004 – 2010, home renovations and repairs were the number two ranked
consumer complaints at the Ontario Ministry of Consumer services, ranked second only
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to collection agencies.3 The construction industry in Canada is a key factor in this
country’s economic well-being. From 2005 – 2009, the construction industry contributed
5.8% to 6.1% each year to Canada’s GDP.4 Thus this is an area that warrants
significant attention, as measures that will reduce transactions costs will have a positive
effect on economic growth generally.

I should state from the outset, that one should not be left with an assumption that
erroneous estimates only work against consumers – in fact, it is quite possible for
losses with respect to erroneous estimates to fall upon contractors who are forced to
bear the loss or risk going to court. Indeed, one of the underlying themes that one finds
oneself grappling with when deciding upon what the proper course of action ought to be
in cases like this is the old tort question of which party is in the best position to bear the
loss.5

Suffice it to say, that the conventional approach that contractors tend to follow in
cases where there is a dispute in the nature of the work envisaged by the contract and
its associated estimates, can trace its origins to circumstances where it is the owner of

3

See Ontario Ministry of Consumer Services website. Available Online at <
http://www.sse.gov.on.ca/mcs/en/Pages/Top_Ten_Complaints.aspx > (date accessed: 24 February, 2011).
Statistics Canada. Canada Year Book 2010. Catalogue Number 11 – 402 X. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2010.
Available online: Statistics Canada website < http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-402-x/2010000/pdf/constructioneng.pdf > (date accessed: 24 February, 2011).
4

See generally Justice Learned Hand’s judgment in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir.
1947).
5
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the proposed project that has an information asymmetry that they use to their
advantage, rather than the contractor in a typical small-scale project. Thus in order to
get an appreciation for the position these contractors find themselves, it is worthwhile to
consider some of the business realities that face contractors that engage in larger scale
projects.

Typically, projects of this nature require a contractor to submit a tender in a
competitive bidding process whereby the project owner ultimately selects the bid that
can accomplish their goals for the lowest possible price. In the pre-tender phase, the
contractor is provided with a set of drawings or specifications that they are then asked
to base their tender upon. It is this information that poses the greatest financial risk for
the contractor since any misrepresentations (innocent or otherwise), or errors, could
result in the contractor being forced to bear the risks of errors in estimations that are
contained in the tender. The risks for the contractor include inaccuracies in the
quantities of items to be supplied, or units of material to be excavated or provided such
as fill that are contained in the owner’s drawings. 6 These are typically estimated
amounts, and thus any variances therefrom can have very significant effects on the
builder’s costs.7 This is further compounded when pre-engineering leaves much to be

6

Goldsmith, Immanuel. Goldsmith on Canadian Building Contracts (4th Edition) (loose-leaf). Thomas G.
Heintzman Ed. Toronto: Thomson – Carswell, 2007 at 2 – 5 (footnotes omitted).
7

Ibid.
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desired and errors subsequently come to light once work is substantially under way or
practically completed.8

To quote from Immanuel Goldsmith:
Although an owner may provide expressly that the quantities
provided are estimates only, it is suggested that an “estimate”
must be more than a rough guess; it must bear some
relation to reality. This has been recognized in a number of
government and other contracts in recent years by the
inclusion of a provision that if the quantities vary by 15 per
cent, or in some cases 20 per cent, more or less, the parties
will renegotiate the prices. To the extent that such a
provision is merely an agreement to agree, the result in the
case of an overrun or underrun is that there is no agreement
between the parties with regard to the item in question until a
new price has been negotiated, and if the parties cannot
agree on a new price, there is no express contract with
regard to that particular item and, if it is one that is
fundamental to the contract, there may be no contract at all. 9

One will notice that from a legal perspective, the primary options available to contractors
in these tender types of cases are traditional contractual remedies and remedies in
quasi – contract. In the event that a contract is held to be valid between the parties, the
contractor can avail themselves of remedies for breach of contract or misrepresentation
either innocent or fraudulent. The remedies available for these actions include
damages or in some cases rescission.10

8

Ibid.

9

Ibid. at 2 – 6 to 2 – 7 (footnotes omitted).

10

Ibid. at 2 – 4.
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The risk to the contractor is very high if they fail to accurately estimate the complexity
and costs of the job before them. As such, there exists a significant financial incentive
for the contractor to protect themselves in contract based upon their own estimations of
proposed project. Should this estimate prove to be faulty and the contract does not
adequately protect the contractor for their excess costs, there exists the risk that the
contractor will go unpaid for the work that they have performed. As a result, omissions
in contract drafting or in estimations that give rise to a project with inaccurate estimates
or are more elaborate than originally thought, can lead to significant consequences to
contractors who must bear any burdens associated with these errors and omissions.
The common law has recognized this fact as one leading to an injustice where the
owner is said to receive a benefit without having to pay for it and it is through the action
in quantum meruit (below) that the law provides a remedy to contractors for the benefits
of any work that they have conferred on the owner.

The Action for Quantum Meruit

The situation becomes somewhat more complicated where proposed contractual
terms do not reflect a consensus ad idem, and thus falls outside of the terms of the
contractual relationship. In these cases, the contractor must look for a remedy in
restitution. The remedy that is typically requested in situations where parties enter into
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an agreement for the supply of goods and services where there is a failure to negotiate
a price term, is one to recover the “reasonable value” of the goods and services that are
supplied. This is typically made by means of a claim in quantum meruit and quantum
valedet for the value of the services rendered and goods supplied respectively
[hereinafter quantum meruit].11 That is to say, that the plaintiff in a quantum meruit
claim is alleging that the defendant has received a benefit in the form of an
improvement to their property that they cannot expect to retain without having to pay
something reasonable for the value of the improvement. For our purposes here, I will
focus on the claim in quantum meruit in dealing with the nature of the claims raised in
building contracts.

With respect to building contracts, quantum meruit is typically pleaded as an
alternative argument when the terms of the building contract prove to be ineffectual.
This arises where there is a dispute with respect to the nature of the work to be
performed under the building contract that one of the parties refuses to honour. In the
building context, this can occur where the contractor is asked to perform work that
would properly be said to fall outside of the building contract and hence can be
classified to be an “extra” from the perspective of the builder. From the owner’s
perspective this would pertain to work that the owner thought ought to be considered to

11

See 936464 Ontario v. Mungo Bear Ltd (2003). 258 D.L.R. (4th) 754 (Here the court rejected the notion that
quantum meruit is an equitable remedy), See also McLean v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [2007] 5 W.W.R.
724 at para. 69 where Justice Rogers states that quamtum meruit is an equitable remedy for which any claimant
thereof must come to court with clean hands. While this argument may be effective for our purpose below, the
literature in restitution tends to view quantum meruit as a restitutionary remedy rather than an equitable one (see
discussion below).
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fall under the work described under the contract but which the builder claims is outside
of the scope of the work agreed upon.

The precise nature of the remedy in quantum meruit is one that has changed over
time to reflect a changing consensus of the historical basis upon which the remedy has
been awarded. This is important to note since the changes in the legal basis for the
remedy have wide ranging effects on precisely which legal doctrines ought to apply
when considering the merits of a claim in quantum meruit. Quantum meruit is a
restitutionary remedy and there has been some debate over where it originates – is it a
species of the common law legal restitution and its related concepts of assumpsit and
quasi - contract,12 is it derived from equitable restitution that comprises mainly of
constructive trusts, resulting trusts and equitable liens13 or is it something that owes its
existence to some other organizing restitutionary principles that are distinct from the
traditional legal and equitable restitutionary remedies?

Over the past ten years, the authorities in Canada and the United Kingdom have
tended to move away from the notion of quantum meruit as being an equitable remedy
or species of implied contract. Indeed, it is important to note that the implied contract
theory that once formed the basis for actions in quasi contract has since fallen out of

Doug Rendleman. “Quantum Meruit and the Subcontractor: Has Restitution Jumped off Dawson’s Dock?” 79
(2000) Texas Law Review 2055, at 2060.
12

13

Ibid.
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favour among Anglo-Canadian restitutionary scholars14 who have now tended to view
the unjust enrichment principle as the proper organizing principle of restitution.15 This
has had a significant impact on the analysis that pertains to quantum meruit itself, which
in turn has led to some confusion with respect to the nature of the claim itself, and how
it ought to apply to cases of building contracts both in the large and small scale contexts.

Historically, the nature of the claim in quantum meruit was one that demanded that
an individual receive a reasonable remuneration for the services rendered to another.16
In order to render the defendant liable, the plaintiff had to show that the services were
requested in some manner by the defendant.17 It is at this juncture that the confusion
over whether quantum meruit is a species of quasi – contract or whether it is based on
the unjust enrichment principle arises. Quantum meruit cases tend to arise pursuant to
contracts where the remuneration or prices of goods and services have not been
agreed.18 As a result, one could then use quasi – contract to “imply” that a party that
requests goods and services from another has implicitly promised to pay for them.
However, this analysis has been found unsatisfactory in the literature, and as was
mentioned above, the literature has tended to characterize quantum meruit as one that

14

See for instance Lord Goff of Chievely and Gareth Jones. The Law of Restitution. London: Sweet and Maxwell,
2007 at 1 – 004.
15

See Goff and Jones supra at 1-012 to 1-016 and Peter D. Maddaugh and John D. McCamus. The Law of
Restitution Looseleaf Edition. Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2010 at 2:200 to 2:400.
16

See Maddaugh and McCamus supra note 15 at 4:200.30.

17

See Goff and Jones supra note 14 at 1-002.

18

Maddaugh and McCamus supra note 15 at 4:200.30.
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is based on unjust enrichment rather than quasi-contract as a predominant principle that
will allow one to find the conceptual unity that is required in order to reconcile the
majority of claims that are enforced by this cause of action.19

Quantum Meruit and the Unjust Enrichment Principle

Since quantum meruit can properly be classified to be based upon unjust enrichment,
it only follows that any claim for quantum meruit conform to the tests that have been laid
down in order to qualify for restitutionary relief. The Supreme Court of Canada has
tended to revisit the notion of restitutionary remedies and the basis upon which such
remedies can be awarded from time to time in response to numerous changing social
values and numerous developments that occur outside of Canada. The test has been
more recently refined in the 2004 Supreme Court case of Garland vs. Consumers’
Gas.20 Here Mr. Justice Iacobucci defined the test for unjust enrichment as comprising
of three elements:

1. an enrichment of the defendant;
2. a corresponding deprivation of the plaintiff; and

19

See note 15 supra.

20

Garland vs. Consumers’ Gas Co., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 629, 2004 SCC 25.
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3. an absence of juristic reason for the enrichment.21

In reaching this determination, Justice Iacobucci makes reference to the
aforementioned test as being well established in Canada.22 Where this case departs
from the older established caselaw is in its elaboration of the third prong of the test – the
absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment.

In Garland, the court held that while the principle of unjust enrichment should be
allowed to move beyond its traditional confines, guidelines ought to be offered to trial
judges in order to indicate the boundaries of the new equitable cause of action.23 As
such, the court laid down a new test that will govern the applicability of the third prong.
According to the court, the plaintiff must show that no juristic reason from an established
category exists to deny recovery.24 The established categories include a contract,
disposition of law, a donative intent and other valid common law, equitable or statutory
obligations.25 If there is no juristic reason from an established category, then the
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case under the juristic reason component of the

21

Ibid as per Iacobucci J. at para. 30 citing Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834 at p. 848; Peel (Regional
Municipality) v. Canada, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 762, at p. 784.
22

Ibid. at para. 30.

23

Ibid. at para. 40.

24

Ibid. at para. 44.

25

Ibid.
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analysis.26 The case is rebuttable where the defendant can show that there is another
reason to deny recovery and allow the defendant to retain the benefit in question. The
court defines these factors as:

i)

the reasonable expectations of the parties; and

ii)

public policy considerations.

In a later decision, the court held that the test for juristic reasons is a flexible one and
that the relevant factors that the court may take into account will depend upon the
situation before the court.27

The development of the juristic reasons tests has had an impact on claims in
quantum meruit in addition to influencing traditional cases in resititution. Historically, in
any action for quantum meruit, the plaintiff had to demonstrate that the defendant had in
some manner, requested and freely accepted the benefit that they now refused to
compensate the plaintiff for. This was particularly the case where a claim in quantum
meruit is asserted in situations where services are rendered pursuant to a contract
which had not been substantially performed and which the defendant had wrongfully

26

Ibid.

27

Kerr v. Baranow, [2011] S.C.C. 10 at para. 44.
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repudiated.28 The principle of free acceptance finds its expression in the equitable
doctrine of acquiescence which serves to protect the improver of land in circumstances
where the property owner has stood by, or allowed them to do so, in which case courts
have held it unconscionable for the landowner to deny that they have received a
benefit.29 It is this paradigm that has traditionally guided claims for quantum mertuit in
the case of building contracts that have been frustrated or repudiated in some manner
by one of the parties.

Indeed, this poses some issues with respect to claims in quantum meruit that are
asserted in the context of building contracts. As the Supreme Court stated in Garland,
defendants in cases involving established categories of restitutionary relief such as
contracts, may still have recourse to the third prong of the test for restitutionary relief
(absence of juristic reason) as a means of rebutting the prima facie case made by the
claimant. Questions arise however, when the contract itself is the subject of dispute
with respect to the type of work that is called for to be performed pursuant to the
contract (see discussion above). That is to say, what if any, is the restitutionary remedy
that one can look to in cases where the contract that is the subject of the dispute is itself
deemed to be ineffectual?

28

See Goff and Jones supra note 14 at 1 – 021.

29

Ibid. at 1 – 021.
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The conventional restitutionary approach with respect to ineffectual agreements has
held that an unjust enrichment may occur where benefits are conferred through the
performance of obligations that are ineffective for a number of reasons.30 These include
by reason of:

•

want of formality,

•

lack of capacity of one of the parties,

•

want of authority on the part of an agent purporting to bind a principal,

•

mistake, misunderstanding or uncertainty, or

•

being induced by misrepresentation.31

The general rule in common law and equity has been to grant recovery of benefits that
have been conferred through the performance of such agreements.32 However, where
an agreement fails by reason of illegality, the general rule is said to be the converse –
that is to say that restitutionary relief will be denied.33 This fact has been labeled a
deficiency by Maddaugh and McCamus, who argue that in the case of ineffective
transactions, the question that must be posed in the context of restitutionary claims for
the recovery of benefits conferred under an ineffective transaction is whether the

30

Maddaugh and McCamus supra note 15 at 3:400.20.

31

Ibid.

32

Ibid.

33

Ibid.
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granting of relief will undermine the rule of contract law that had rendered the
transaction ineffective.34 They also identify a couple of subsidiary questions that may
arise in the ineffective transactions context including:

1. Should the contract in question act as a guide in setting a limit for the relief that is
granted in the restitutionary claim?
2. Is the unwillingness of the plaintiff or defendant to go forward with the ineffective
transaction relevant to the determination to impose restitutionary liability on the
defendant?35

Maddaugh and McCamus posit that the answers to these questions need to be
considered within the context of the particular ineffective transaction to which they are
thought to be pertinent.36

It can be argued that this mode of analysis is in keeping with the third prong of the
test laid out by Justice Iacobucci in Garland above and certainly can be built into an
analysis of the application of the third prong of the test to the facts under consideration.
One way of viewing both of these approaches is to say that they are meant to guard

34

Ibid.

35

Ibid.

36

Ibid.
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against the possibility that an award under unjust enrichment may serve to undermine a
well-established rule in contract law by having a party “lose” under the contract but “win”
in restitution. As such then, it can be said that one way to view the two approaches is to
import a sort of equitable “clean hands” doctrine that is meant to ensure that the party
that is seeking relief from the Court has not in any manner contributed to the failure of
the contract.

When considering the application of the third prong of the test in Garland to building
contracts, one will notice that the result of the test may vary based upon the conduct of
the contractor and the owner respectively. Considering the first part of the test, the
reasonable expectations of the parties, one could argue that in any building contract,
each side is expecting to have work performed as described by the contract, for the
price that is stipulated under the contract. However, what happens when an
informational asymmetry is present? In the large scale context where the owner has the
informational advantage, the contractor can very well argue that they would expect the
owner to furnish them with all of the requisite information that is required to get an
accurate picture of the nature of the work involved so that the contractor can make an
informed tender. Moreover, they would also expect to be compensated for all of the
work they have performed and would not expect to carry out any additional work that is
not called for under the building contract.

~ 20 ~

The situation is different in the smaller scale context where there is a reliance on the
contractor’s expertise on the part of the owner. Here the owner can argue that they
would reasonably expect the contractor to advise them of the nature of the work to be
performed and give them an accurate estimation of the costs that are involved. This is
the case since it is the contractor that possesses the technical expertise that the owner
is relying on in order to decide upon the type of work that they are prepared to contract
for. An owner could reasonably expect that the contract reflect closely the estimate that
was given with respect to the costs associated with the proposed project.

With respect to the public policy prong of the test, one cannot help but consider the
questions raised by Maddaugh and McCamus above, namely would the granting of a
restitutionary remedy frustrate rules and doctrines developed in contract law? I would
submit however, that the proper way to analyze cases of this nature lies in a
consideration of the informational asymmetries that exist between the owner and the
contractor. As such, any court will be called upon to determine which of the two parties
is in the best position to ascertain the nature of the work to be done pursuant to the
contract and which party is in the best position to furnish the other with an accurate
estimate of the quantity and cost of the work to be performed.

Returning once again to the question posed with respect to the contract itself as a
guide to quantifying the amount of the remedy awarded. Here again, the answer is
largely dependent upon whether one is considering the large scale or small scale
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context. If the contract has a fixed price associated with it, this is certainly something
that can be useful to a court in assessing the relative value that each of the parties has
attached to the work performed.37 However, in the small scale context where cost plus
contracts are more prevalent, the nature of the contract itself renders the value
calculation much more difficult to ascertain. This then puts courts in the unenviable
position of feeling obliged to award “something” for the benefit of the work that has been
performed since the contract itself obliges the owner to compensate the contractor for
any and all work performed. This award will most likely occur as a factual determination
at trial which may or may not objectively reflect the true value of the benefits conferred.
Further issues emerge however, if one considers that the contract may have been
entered into by the owner as a result of representations contained in the estimate that
they may have relied upon to their detriment. From a public policy perspective, courts
will be called upon to balance freedom of contract considerations against imposing
liability on the contractor on the basis of a misrepresentation that is brought about by a
faulty estimate. However, since the determination is difficult to make and certainly
depends upon the particular facts before the court at any given time, there is an element
of uncertainty here as to how that balancing will occur and upon what basis can
damages be awarded on an objective basis thereby increasing transactions costs in the
small scale context.

37

Goff and Jones supra note 14 at 20 – 022.
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Part Two: Current Practices in the Construction Industry as they
Relate to the Use of Contracts and Claims for Quantum Meruit

Contractual Variations and Risk Allocation
Having regard to previous instances where large scale projects exposed contractors
to significant risks with respect to onerous or vague contractual terms, the industry has
responded with the development of a number of contractual variations that are designed
to reflect different bargains that may be entered into between contractors and owners
alike. I will discuss each of the variations below. Needless to say, the questions that
these forms are designed to address are primarily directed to the mode by which the
contractor’s services are to be remunerated. Drawing upon Goldsmith, some of the
more common forms of building contracts include:

Fixed Price / Lump Sum Contracts: Under this type of contract, the contractor agrees to
carry out all of the work involved in the construction for a fixed lump sum.38 As such,
the contractor is legally bound to complete all of the work agreed upon in the contract
for the agreed upon price and no more regardless of whether or not the work may be
more than the contractor anticipated.39 Contracts of this nature often provide for a
contingency allowance in order to deal with any unforeseen contingencies as they may

38

Goldsmith supra note 6 at 4 – 2.

39

Ibid.
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arise.40 Notice however, that all of the risk that the project may cost more than
anticipated, or any benefit that arises from the project coming in under budget, will
accrue to the detriment or benefit of the contractor as the case may be.

Contracts of this nature tend to be favoured by owners since this type of contract
defines the maximum liability to be incurred in connection with the work and shifts the
risk of substantial unforeseen costs onto the contractor.41 According to Goldsmith, the
contractor in substance provides a guarantee that the work will not exceed the
stipulated amount and as a result, before entering into such a contract, a contractor is
advised to be fully familiar with the nature of the work to be carried out, and should
provide for an appropriate contingency allowance.42

Unit Price Contracts: Under this type of arrangement, each unit of work, whether it
involves the supply of materials or the provision of labour has a specific price and the
total contract price is calculated by multiplying the number of different units by the
respective unit prices and then adding the two calculated amounts together.43 This
contract has the benefit of giving the owner some idea of the total price, but unlike the
fixed price contract, it does not guarantee that the final amount will not be substantially
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exceeded.44 Moreover, there is no guarantee to the contractor that the total contract
price will not be less if it should come about that there are fewer units of work to be
done than was originally anticipated.45 These types of contracts typically contain
provisions specifying what overhead and profit allowance the contractor is entitled to
since this is the only means available to them to obtain revenue under the contract. 46

Cost Plus Contracts: Under these types of contracts, owners agree to pay the
contractor their actual direct costs of doing the work in addition to a stipulated
percentage for overhead and profit.47 The percentage of profit is a matter of agreement
between the parties, however the figure that is typically used is 10 per cent48 with some
cases deciding that a markup of 20 per cent on labour and material may be considered
reasonable.49

Unlike the fixed price contract, this type of contract is the most favourable for
contractors.50 Goldsmith states that although the contractor cannot make any exorbitant
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profits, they are assured of not making a loss.51 Hence, in this instance, one could
argue that it is the owner that is guaranteeing the contractor that they will have all of
their costs covered as all of the risk of the work being more involved than was originally
envisaged now shifts to the owner who must assume all of the risk.

In addition, the cost price concept is also typically used in order to price “extras” that
may arise over the course of construction or to cover any unforeseen items in a unit
price contract where there may be insufficient time to negotiate additional unit prices.52
The nature of what constitutes an “extra” is also of some significance for our purposes.
If there are variations in the proposed project, or if there are any unforeseen
circumstances that the contractor did not anticipate, then they will attempt to bill the
owner over and above the original terms contained in the contract on the basis that the
work in question has subsequently followed the signing of the contract and hence goes
beyond what the contractor originally bargained for (more on this below).

The Definition and Nature of “Extras” in a Building Contract

It is helpful at this juncture to review the law as it relates to what constitutes an “extra”
and how the contract that pertains to this work is actually formed. In the ordinary course,
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a contractor is obliged to perform only such work as is included in the original contract.53
Contracts typically then contain a clause that provides for the contingency that extra
work may need to be performed or that the owner may request alterations to the original
project and hence, the owner is given the right under the original contract to order extra
work and the contract will specify the method of payment for such work (typically on a
cost plus basis).54

Goldsmith defines an extra as work, that although not specified for in the contract,
the owner is nevertheless entitled to require the contractor to perform, as distinct from
work properly called for by the contract or work that is substantially different from and
wholly outside of the scope of the work contemplated by the contract.55 With respect to
work that is required to be performed under the contract, the contractor is obliged to
perform the work without being entitled to any further remuneration beyond the contract
price.56 However, where work is performed that is outside of the scope of the contract,
the owner cannot compel the contractor to perform the work at all unless a new
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agreement is entered into between the parties.57 It should be noted, however, that in
the absence of any specific agreement as to price, the contractor can recover on a
quantum meruit basis.58 With respect to work that is in original drawings and
specifications that formed a part of the original contract, Goldsmith states:

If, on the proper construction of the contract documents,
which generally include the drawings and specifications, the
item of work is one which the contractor is required to
perform, it cannot be an extra, notwithstanding the fact the
contractor may have failed to realize at the time of entering
into the contract that he would be required to perform such
work. If on the other hand, the work is not specifically called
for by the contract when properly interpreted, but is
nevertheless properly within the scope of the work as
originally contemplated, it is an “extra.”59

However, in order to qualify as an extra, there is an additional requirement: the work in
question must have been authorized either explicitly or implicitly by the owner.60
Otherwise, the consequences for the contractor are described by Goldsmith as follows:

A contractor who voluntarily and without instructions does
additional work not required by the contract is not entitled to
57
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any extra payment therefor unless the owner, by standing
with knowledge of what is being done, can be held to have
impliedly authorized such extra work, or unless the extra
work was necessitated by a misrepresentation made by the
owner.61

The question remains, how is this authorization to take place? In the typical large
scale project, an engineer or supervising architect acting on behalf of the owner will
typically call for and authorize extras as the necessity for such work arises in the course
of construction.62 Legally speaking, many building contracts contain express provisions
that specify what condition precedents must be satisfied in order to entitle the contractor
to payment.63 Quite often, these provisions will require the contractor to obtain written
instructions or authorization from the owner or their agent.64 As was mentioned above,
remuneration with respect to extras is typically assessed on a cost plus basis.

Where authorization for extras is not expressly provided, the law in this area remains
somewhat unsettled. For instance, Goldsmith cites a line of cases that state that
contractors that fail to obtain written authorizations under contracts that require them as
a condition precedent to payment for any extra work, cannot recover additional payment
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therefor.65 However, there are still some unresolved ambiguities despite some of these
holdings. For example, a contractor is entitled to recover even in the absence of the
architect’s approval if the work is collateral to the contract and not performed pursuant
to it.66 In addition, whether or not a written order is a condition precedent to payment is
a matter of construction of the contract that may be considered to be waived by the
owner’s conduct67 or acquiescence.68

The General Law of Estimates

Finally, it is worth considering what the law of estimates has to say before moving on
to see how all of these actions fit together in modern jurisprudence. Construction
parlance tends to draw a distinction between estimates and quotations. Generally
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speaking, an estimate is frequently characterized as an “educated guess” as to what a
particular job might cost.69 These can be given in writing or orally.70 As such, there is
no “guarantee” that the maker warrants that the figures used will be accurate. In
contrast, a quotation is a fixed price offer made to the consumer that cannot be changed
even to taken into account previously unforeseen circumstances once accepted. One
Australian governmental authority even goes so far as to describe a quotation as a
legally enforceable document71 although a distinction is also made with “cost plus
quotations.”72

It is interesting to note however that legally speaking, the cases in England and
Canada on the law of estimates make no distinction between estimates and quotations
(more on this below). As far back as 1826, courts have been asked to interpret the
legal effect of an estimate / quotation. In Moneypenny v. Hartland73 Best C.J. states at
172:

But if a surveyor delivers in an estimate, greatly below the
sum at which a work can be done, and thereby induces a
See “Price lists, estimates, quotations and tenders.” U.K. Govt. Business Link website. Available Online at: <
http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/bdotg/action/detail?itemId=1073792180&type=RESOURCES > (date accessed:
15 March, 2011).
69
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private person to undertake what he would not otherwise do;
then I think he is not entitled to recover . . .

Later on at 173 – 174, the Chief Justice continues:

It appears from the case cited,74 that my Lord Chief Justice
Abbott was of the same opinion. His Lordship says, “I think
it of great importance to the public, that gentlemen in the
situation of the plaintiff should know, that if they make
estimates and do not use all reasonable care to make
themselves informed, they are not entitled to recover any
thing.”
… It is said that to-day there is a difference between an
estimate and a contract. I do not agree in that observation:
between honest men there is no difference at all. A man
should not estimate a work at a price at which he would not
contract for it; for if he does, he deceives his employer.

Note that there is no element of fraud or deceit that needs to be alleged here in order to
prove the case.

This was followed by the famous judgement of Lord Denning in Esso v. Mardon75
that involved the representations made by Esso to a prospective franchisee regarding
the expected throughput that Esso had forecast for a particular petrol station with rent to
be calculated accordingly. The throughput was originally estimated at 200,000 gallons
per annum, which the defendant originally questioned but was reassured by Esso’s
representatives that they had extensive experience in these matters and that they stood
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by their projections.76 The actual throughput was 78,00077 and was a financial disaster
for Mardon following which, Esso attempted to eject him and Mardon counterclaimed on
the basis of negligent misrepresentation.78 With respect to the liability that a
professional has in making forecasts / estimates / projections to another, Lord Denning
states:

It seems to me that if such a person makes a forecast,
intending that the other should act upon it – and he does act
upon it, it can well be interpreted as a warranty that the
forecast is sound and reliable in the sense that they made it
with reasonable care and skill … If the forecast turned out to
be an unsound forecast such as no person of skill or
experience should have made, there is a breach of
warranty.79

Later on his Lordship continues:
… if a man, who has or professes to have special knowledge
or skill, makes a representation by virtue thereof to another –
be it advice, information or opinion – with the intention of
inducing him to enter into a contract with him, he is under a
duty to use reasonable care to see that the representation is
correct, and that the advice, information or opinion is reliable.
If he negligently gives unsound advice or misleading
information or expresses an erroneous opinion, and thereby
induces the other side to enter into a contract with him, he is
liable in damages.80
76

Ibid. at 804 – 805.

77

Ibid. at 816.

78

Ibid. at 804.

79

Ibid. at 818.

80

Ibid. at 820.

~ 33 ~

Canadian cases have held estimates to be binding in light of the fact that the
contractor is a professional whose expertise the owner is relying upon and paying for.
The following quotation was considered in the leading case of Kidd v. Mississauga
Hydro-Electric Commission et al.81 Here Justice Grange states:

The cases dealing with estimates generally concern the
obligation of the architect or engineer to predict the cost of
the work of others: see Pratt v. St. Albert Protestant
Separate School District No. 6 (1969), 69 W.W.R. 62,
affirmed 71 W.W.R. 320; and Saxby and Pokorny v. Fowler
(1977), 3 Alta. L.R. (2d) 47. But in principle I can see no
reason why the same result should not pertain to the
estimator's own work particularly where it is shown that the
defendant acted upon the false estimate to his detriment.82

The concept was considered more recently in the case of Wolski v. Puckett83 where
Justice Johnson states:

The defendant went so far as to testify that if there were
things he forgot when he prepared his estimate, or that he
had failed to budget for, he could charge those things to the
plaintiffs as extras. Such an interpretation would relieve the
defendant of any responsibility to exercise skill and care in
preparing his estimate, or in his management of the
81
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construction, for which he was charging the plaintiffs his
fee.84

Note here also that the scope of the ability of a builder to charge omitted items or items
that have cost overruns as “extras” has also been significantly curtailed. In a similar
vein is the following passage of Justice Wilson from Cherry Homes v. Perler:

When he [the contractor, Mr. Eddy] received the plans, if he
realized that the project was larger than he had initially
anticipated, he had an obligation to advise Mr. Perler [the
owner], before construction started, that the estimate would
have to be increased. If there were not sufficient
specifications to enable Mr. Eddy to give an accurate
estimate, which he says was the case, it was his obligation
to advise Mr. Perler of that, not to provide a price based on
inadequate specifications.85

However, courts have allowed some variation for unforeseen expenditures in estimates,
though the figure varies depending on the facts of the case ranging from 5 – 15% (see
discussion below). This line of jurisprudence has also found support for the necessity of
increasing costs where the work asked for goes beyond what was originally envisaged.
Speaking of a lawyer’s obligation to their client, Madam Justice McLachlin (as she then
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was) elaborated on the limited circumstances in which a finding may be made as
follows:

Depending on the circumstances, a lawyer may not be
bound by an estimate, if for example, he or she does work
outside the estimate at the request of the client, or if the
client by his or her conduct unduly increases the amount of
the work, or if unforeseen circumstances add a new and
unexpected dimension to the work.86

Hence, the question turns on how much of a deviation from the estimate is the result of
an error or omission on the part of the estimator and to what extent can the deviation be
attributed to the requests or conduct of the client.

Part Three: Recent Canadian Judicial Decisions that Pertain to the
Role of Estimates in Building Contracts

Pre – 2006 Jurisprudence

Part of the difficulty for consumers these days stems from the lack of uniformity that
is presently found in recent jurisprudence that attempts to deal with the law of estimates
and their application to small scale building contracts. The approach taken in the cases
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can be characterised as attempting to apply a literal interpretation of contracts against
the backdrop of assessing what, if any, is the contractual effect of representations with
respect to cost that are made by the builder to the owner. The difficulty in this approach
is that despite the fact that contractors are attempting to impose concepts and remedies
that have been developed in the context of larger scale building projects (cost – plus
contracts, liability for extras etc.), the approach taken by courts has been to adopt some
of the concepts to traditional contract law rather than viewing them as forming part of
the law of estimates per se and the jurisprudence associated therewith (this is all the
more surprising since Mardon87 has been a fixture in most modern contract casebooks!).
That is to say, the approach has been to situate the estimate as an ordinary pre
contractual representation that may or may not be incorporated into the eventual
building contract rather than applying the tests that specifically pertain to estimates.
Part of the difficulty of this approach is that it does not account for the possibility that the
contractor possesses special knowledge or skill in providing the estimate that the owner
relies upon to their detriment.

Until recently, the cases in this area from the 1970s onwards have a chequered
history as the majority of cases have tended to take a rather ad hoc approach to
deciding the issue on the basis of findings of fact exclusively rather than applying
previous precedents. Many of these decisions take place at the trial level and hence
the outcomes largely vary from court to court. While Canadian jurisprudence had made
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advances forward with respect to the law of estimates generally with decisions such as
Kidd,88 the legal doctrines found in Kidd,89 Mardon,90 Moneypenney91 et al. had not yet
found their way into judicial interpretations of the role of estimates with respect to small
scale building contracts.

The nature of the claim advanced by builders in these cases follows a standard
theme. Typically, a builder will argue that any representations made in any precontractual negotiations constitutes an estimate that is either not binding due to the
estimate / quotation dichotomy92 or is no longer valid as a result of the presence of
extras (either explicitly requested by the owner or arising as a result of unforeseen
circumstances with respect to the nature of the work at the time the estimate is made).93
Moreover, it is argued that since the actual contract that is entered into between the
contractor and the owner is a cost plus contract, any representations asserted through
the estimate are negated since the owner has explicitly agreed to pay for the
contractors expenses as they arise plus whatever percentage mark up has been agreed
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to by the parties.94 In the event that the court finds the initial contract between the two
parties is not binding, the contractor will make a claim in quantum meruit in the
alternative.95

As was previously mentioned above, many of the cases up until 2006 tended to rely
on judicial findings of fact that sought to determine whether or not the estimate given by
the contractor constituted part of the actual contract between the contractor and the
owner. Indeed, the approach taken by the courts is one where the matter was to be
decided on which party’s evidence the court chose to believe rather than a strict
application of the caselaw. To wit, in one of the cases, Cherry Homes v. Perler, the
Court discusses the application of the case law after making a determination of the
precise nature of the contract between the parties.96 Justice Wilson even explicitly
states: “I have not, to this point, referred to the cases provided by either counsel. That
is because I consider the matter to be largely one of fact, rather than one requiring
application of the law.”97 Similar findings of fact can be found in numerous other
cases.98 While some cases do attempt to apply case law, they mainly apply general
contract doctrines rather than applying the law of estimates discussed above.99
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One rather curious decision emerging in the mid 1990’s is the case of Ram Industrial
Equipment Ltd. v. Kolson.100 The case is notable because, despite the fact that the
plaintiff contractor had not pleaded quantum meruit as an alternative claim, the court
proceeded to grant the remedy nevertheless. The reasoning by Justice McIsaac was
that there was no reason to deprive the plaintiff of their rightful claim since the
defendant accepted the benefit of the work carried out101 and that “the circumstances of
the case cry out for such relief.”102 Unfortunately, no mention is made of the case law
that pertains to quantum meruit, but rather the issue is decided by means of applying a
case that states that the remedy is available even if it is not pleaded.103 Kolson was
subsequently upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal104 although in the higher court’s
decision, reference is made to the fact that the plaintiff contractor filed a written copy of
his argument with the trial judge that had been prepared the day before and that this
argument did contain a section on quantum meruit and that submissions were made
before the trial judge with respect to the claim.105 One can only hope then that this
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resolves the ambiguity present in the trial decision and that the lower court decision can
be viewed in this light.

Post – 2006 Jurisprudence

The situation began to change in 2006 with the case of Strait Construction Ltd. v.
Odar.106 Here Justice Dorgan attempts to reconcile the various cases that had
appeared over the years and organize the ratios in the form of a series of questions that
attempt to determine whether or not an estimate is intended to have contractual
effect.107 The questions are as follows:

1. Did the agreement provide for a percentage of the project cost as a fee to the
contractor?108
2. Was price of overriding importance for the owner and was that communicated to
the contractor?109
3. Was an estimate provided and did the owner rely on the estimate?110
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4. Did the owner require the contractor to design a project at a specified cost or
seek assurances as to what the project would cost?111
5. Did the contractor pay for the materials and labour and then bill the owner on a
regular basis for the work done?112
6. Did the contractor make it clear that it was not assuming any of the risk that the
final price would exceed the estimate?113
7. Did the contractor provide the owner with information regarding rates of labour
and equipment rental etc.?114

It is then added that even if the contract does provide for payment on a cost plus basis,
the contractor may still be held liable in the appropriate circumstances.115 As we can
see the court is attempting to reconcile a number of varying approaches arising out of
the cases and this in fact may lead to a rather onerous evidentiary burden on the part of
plaintiffs that are alleging faulty estimates.

Estimates and the Claim in Quantum Meruit
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With respect to the claim for quantum meruit, unfortunately, one finds a similar
approach whereby the remedy is granted without any attempt to apply previous
jurisprudence as it relates to typical claims for quantum meruit.116 However, one does
notice a rather interesting variation with respect to how the claim in quantum meruit is to
be valued. In Goldar Associates Ltd. v. Mill Creek Developments Ltd.117 Justice
Masuhara quotes with approval118 from the decision in Mt. Cheam Developments Ltd. v.
Clark119 where a contractor provided an estimate of $59 800 and later claimed $85
485.75. The Court in Mt. Cheam held that the estimate was binding and then proceeds
to quote with approval from the headnote to Jamieson Construction Co. v. Lacombe &
Northwestern Railway120 that states:
The amount to which a contractor is entitled on a quantum
meruit is the value of the work from the point of view of the
value of the services rendered by him, not the benefit to the
person for whom the work is done. He is entitled to recover
as 'cost', the cost and expenses which he actually incurred in
doing the work insofar as they were reasonable in amount
and reasonably and justifiably incurred with regard to all the
circumstances and conditions of time and place and
relationship of the parties and otherwise existing from time to
time from the beginning of negotiations for the doing of the
work to its conclusion. The burden of proving that the
disbursements were reasonable and otherwise proper is on
him.121
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See Kolson supra note 92 at paras. 7 and 8; Greenhill supra note 92 at paras. 106 to 116 and Goldar supra note
92 at paras. 26 to 29.
117

Goldar supra note 92.

118

Ibid. at para. 27.

119

Mt. Cheam Developments v. Clark (1988], 32 CLR 273 (B.C. SC).

120

Jamieson Construction Co. v. Lacombe & Northwestern Railway [1926] 1 WWR 628 (Alta. CA).

121

Ibid.

~ 43 ~

Justice Masuhara then continues by citing Mt. Cheam below:

In evaluating quantum meruit, Courts may use the estimate
as a starting point and then determine what range of
variance from that estimate was reasonable in the
circumstances. For instance, the Court in Mt. Cheam
Developments, supra at ¶11, adopted the 15% leeway rule
first articulated by the P.E.I. Court of Appeal in Serafin v.
Johnston122, as follows:

. . . '[A]n estimate must be more than a rough guess; it must
bear some relation to reality.' A fuller reading of this
passage indicates that it related to a situation where plans
and specifications in some detail have initially formed the
basis of such estimate. The cases cited by the appellant in
support of this proposition, with which one cannot argue,
granted the premise upon which such 'an estimate' is based,
confirm that proposition, within a leeway of approximately
15%. . . .

The Court's task, therefore, is to determine the value of the
services rendered, by considering the reasonable costs and
expenses incurred in performing the services, having regard
to the amount of reasonable variance from the estimate in all
the circumstances between the parties.123

Thus as we can see, courts have used estimates as a means of limiting the amount that
the contractor is allowed to claim pursuant to quantum meruit rather than simply relying
on the contractor to specify what the work is worth after it has been carried out.
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Another rather novel approach is found in L. Merrick Developments Ltd. v. Fidler.124
In assessing the value of the work performed pursuant to the claim in quantum meruit,
the Court made reference to a third party publication entitled Handscomb’s Yardstick for
Costing 2005.125 This is a trade publication that sets out standard construction rates for
different types of work according to the going rates in various regions throughout the
country (an example given is $3 per meter of drywalling for Vancouver). The rates in
this publication were then used as an objective standard in determining the
reasonableness of the amounts claimed for the work performed.126 It will be interesting
to see whether this becomes more widespread as a means of objectively assessing the
value of the work performed for the purposes of determining an award in quantum
meruit.

Part of the difficulty with these recent decisions is that they fail to draw a clear
baseline legal test that conforms to some of the dicta handed down by courts over the
years. While Madam Justice Dorgan is to be commended for her efforts to systemize
and lay down appropriate principles that will guide courts in the future, owners seeking
relief from the courts must still overcome a significant evidentiary burden if they seek
relief from the cost plus contracts and alternative quantum meruit claims made by
124

Fidler supra note 92.

Author Unknown. Hanscomb’s Yardsticks for Costing: Cost Data for the Canadian construction industry.
Robert S. Means Co., 2005.
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contractors. In contrast, the situation in the earlier cases of Moneypenney,127
Mardon,128 and Kidd129 remains much more clear, as all that the plaintiff has to establish
is that an estimate was given and that they have relied upon it in inducing them to enter
into the contract with the contractor. As such, all that must be proved is that the
representation in the form of the estimate was made and that this served as the basis
under which the consumer made their decision to enter into the contract with the
contractor to their eventual detriment. Indeed, it is respectfully submitted that the
previous approach is the better one as it eliminates the necessity to discuss of rates of
labour, percentages of profit, billings, whether the owner made clear price was of
overriding concern and the like.

Moreover, a bright line rule as established in the earlier cases eliminates the need to
even consider the case from the quantum meruit perspective. The cases are quite clear
that even if the contractor has made a faulty estimate that has been relied upon by the
owner to their detriment, this does not necessarily negate the original contract so as to
give rise to a remedy though quasi contract or even in reliance of the unjust enrichment
principle – after all, the contractor cannot claim that the owner has been enriched
unjustly if the entire raison d’etre for the loss stems from the contractor’s failure to take
adequate care in the preparation of their estimate that they must now bear the
consequences thereof.
127

Moneypenney supra note 73.

128

Mardon supra note 75.

129

Kidd supra note 81.

~ 46 ~

Part Four: The Need for a New Bright Line Rule

The law in this area has come full circle from the original development of the law of
estimates and quantum meruit as they apply to building contracts. On the one hand,
the case law had initially been developed to protect contractors from unscrupulous
owners who provided contractors with specifications that were either distorted or
incomplete and then expected contractors to perform work that was more extensive
than originally envisaged or was a radical departure from the original specifications that
were provided to the contractor. To be sure, these situations may be still present today
even in the context of small scale building contracts.130 However, it can be argued that
one of the reasons for many of these disputes was the power imbalance that resulted
from information asymmetries that existed between contractors and owners and
ensuring that contractors were reasonably compensated for the work that they were
engaged to perform.

As we have seen, information asymmetries are also present in the small scale
context where reliance is placed by the owner on the knowledge and skill of the
contractor. Under the present legal regime, it is now the small scale owner who must
go to great lengths to demonstrate to the contractor (and the court) that it is relying on

130

See for example Odar supra note 93 where a couple originally contracted to build a bed and breakfast and then
half way through construction, decided to change the project to a luxury bed and breakfast but insisted that portions
of the original estimate were still binding.
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their expertise in order to obtain an accurate estimate of the cost of the proposed
project and to ascertain what level of work needs to be performed in order to realize the
project. Rather than providing the contractor a detailed set of specifications that the
contractor is invited to bid upon, the level of reliance on the contractor’s expertise is
even greater in the small scale context where the contractor is not only expected to
carry out the work called for in the contract, but is also expected to provide their
expertise in providing for the architecture and engineering for the project as a whole.
While the former remedy was designed to compensate for an information asymmetry
that was particular to how business was conducted in the construction industry, the
remedy (that is to say reliance on unfettered cost plus contracts and quantum meruit in
the alternative) is now being used against those who are at the informational
disadvantage as a result of their lack of familiarity with the art of construction and
everything that it entails. What was at one time a defensive mechanism that could be
used to shield contractors, can now be used by contractors at great lengths against
small scale consumers and small businesses.

Indeed, were legislatures to extend the ten percent rule found in Ontario across the
country and even extend its application to small scale business owners in particular, I
submit that endless cases of litigation could be avoided, and more stability brought to
the marketplace. Just as business is said to benefit from predictability and certainty in
the marketplace, the ten percent rule would allow small business to make more
informed choices and decisions without the high transactions costs that result from
lower confidence in the numbers that are supplied by contractors that lack an incentive
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to take reasonable care in preparing their estimates that others are relying upon. The
ten percent variance represents a reasonable compromise in allowing the contractor to
recover for some unforeseen expenditures but placing an upper limit to the amount that
is recovered.

It may be argued that the extension of the ten percent rule is unnecessary in the
case of small business owners, since they are presumed to be sophisticated parties that
can comprehend the terms that they are being offered in these cost plus contracts and
are free to negotiate any terms that they deem necessary. As such, any statutory
interventions can be seen as an unnecessary intrusion into the private dealings of
individuals and a restriction of the freedom to contract.

However, what recent cases demonstrate is that far from being a bargain between
two equally positioned parties, there is confusion over just what is entailed by the cost
plus contract. It is worth remembering that this is a contract that was developed to
redress some of the inequities that were previously experienced by contractors. As
such, the particular form of this contract may be completely foreign even to experienced
business people that have absolutely no background in construction. And indeed, the
representations that are made to the owner by the contractor through their quote /
estimate would leave one to believe, quite reasonably I would think, that the final costs
under the cost plus contract will bear some relation to the estimated amount subject to
minor variances as a result of unforeseen circumstances. Thus while not assuring the
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owner of a precise amount to be billed, a reasonable individual ought to draw the
inference that since the contractor is a professional offering their professional
assessment of the costs of the proposed project, this individual may be presumed to be
offering an estimate that will be sound and accurate.

Yet one of the broader questions to be contemplated if one were to consider
broadening the ten percent rule, is how could such a regulation be extended to cover
the small business person typically engaged in these small scale projects without
disrupting the present legal regime that applies to large scale contracts? One possible
way would be to amend provincial consumer protection statutes so that transactions
under a predefined dollar value would be covered under its provisions rather than the
current test as to whether an individual is acting for a personal or household purpose. It
is respectfully submitted, that such an approach will encourage parties to take
reasonable care in drafting contracts for high value construction projects but will provide
a bright line rule that will benefit small businesses by allowing for greater cost certainty
that is crucial for getting many of these businesses off to a successful start.

After all, it is rather curious that small business persons are presumed by the CPA in
its present form to be sophisticated parties that are capable of protecting their interests
when in fact this may not necessarily be the case while at the same time certain
sophisticated individuals are protected by the act so long as they are acting in a
personal capacity. To wit, a small businessperson engaging the services of a contractor
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for a project, say for around $50 000, receives no protection under the Act despite the
fact that they may have no experience in construction whatsoever. In contrast, a land
developer building a $4 million dollar home for their own personal use can avail
themselves of the provisions of the act. Obviously, the land developer is in a better
position to understand the nature of the bargain that is entered into than is the small
businessperson. And presumably, one should be more diligent with contracts of such a
high value. I will leave aside the question of whether all of the provisions of the
consumer protection statutes ought to be amended so as to reconsider the definition of
a consumer as this should be developed more fully in another paper. Suffice it to say,
that with respect to this issue in particular, the state of the law in its present form leaves
much to be desired from a public policy perspective.

As we have seen, many of the cases that have been litigated over the past number
of years are primarily trial level decisions. These decisions have been rather uneven as
more often than not, they are decided on the basis of findings of fact. As such, with the
present claims made by contractors of claims on the basis of the cost plus contract, with
quantum meruit pleaded in the alternative, there exists little incentive for the contractor
to exercise the level of care that one could reasonably expect of a professional in a
comparative circumstance.

After all, under current conditions, a contractor is in a much better position than the
owner at the outset before litigation is even commenced. For instance, the contractor
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enters litigation confident that in the event that the initial cost plus contract is set aside
as a result of a faulty estimate, or significantly curtailed as a result of the court finding
that the estimate is binding, they can at least be assured of a finding in favour of what
the value of the project is reasonably worth through an assessment in quantum meruit.
In other words, the contractor is assured at a minimum that they will be compensated
for the work they have performed even if they have claimed a significantly higher
amount pursuant to the contract. The dispute in court will likely revolve around what
work was originally contemplated by the estimate and what can be termed to be an
“extra” not covered by the original estimate. Since the amounts in dispute are typically
not very high, the contractor can rely on a potentially positive outcome in quantum
meruit in settlement negotiations since the economic costs of litigation may work against
the plaintiff owner relative to the costs of litigation.

Although many of the recent cases have been gently edging towards the existing law
of estimates in contract law and quantum meruit in restitution, the results are still less
than satisfactory. A bright line rule that limits the ability of contractors to recover over
and above their estimated amounts (subject of course to a reasonable allowance for
minor unforeseen contingencies) will help to resolve this confusion, relieve courts from
the tedious exercise of determining whether or not the estimate has any contractual
effect, bring greater predictability for small business, and provide for a stronger
incentive for contractors to take care when preparing their estimates. Indeed, given the
vulnerability of owners in this position, it can be argued that the contractor is in the best
position to bear the loss in these cases.
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Conclusion
The historical evolution of the law as it pertains to a builder’s liability of estimates can
be viewed as an attempt to maintain balance. Initially, the caselaw developed in such a
manner so as to protect contractors that were acting in good faith from the conduct of
unscrupulous owners that sought to capitalize on information asymmetries to the
detriment of contractors who were in some cases misled, and were forced to bear the
burden of relying on the owner’s faulty specifications. In recent years, the law has been
used by contractors against owners that are relying on the contractor’s expertise in
advising them of what is involved in the proposed project and what it will cost.

It has become clear that the law must now be readjusted in order to get the balance
right. A bright line rule is necessary to ensure that small-scale owners can confidently
rely on the estimates that they are given by contractors. This will result in greater
predictability and certainty and reduce transactions costs as a result. Contractors will
benefit as instances of unscrupulous contractors using misleading estimates will
decrease. This will go a long way towards increasing confidence in the industry and
rewarding contractors that provide accurate estimates – individuals that have been
unjustly prejudiced as a result of the actions of unscrupulous individuals that have hurt
the industry as a whole.
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